REST API

Sanctions screening API down: fail open or fail closed?

If your sanctions screening API is down, fail closed: nobody is activated, no money moves and no application is approved until a screening result for that exact person is on record. Fail open, which means treating “no answer” as “no match”, is what turns a sanctions screening API outage from a vendor incident into a violation. OFAC’s June 2026 introduction to its sanctions regime says civil penalties can rest on a strict liability standard, so in many cases a U.S. person is liable even without knowing the party was sanctioned. The maximum civil penalty it cites is $377,700 per apparent violation of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), as of January 2025 and adjusted for inflation each year.

Scope: OFAC (U.S.) rules are the reference here. EU, UK and other regimes set their own duties and deadlines, so check yours. This is engineering guidance, not legal advice. Last reviewed: 25 October 2026.

What should happen if the sanctions screening API is down? Fail closed

Fail closed means the default answer to any screening failure is “not cleared”. One thing, and only one, moves a person from pending to active: a stored clear result tied to the data you actually submitted. A timeout, a 5xx error, an empty body, an unreadable payload and an unrecognised status value all produce the same outcome. That is the whole of the fail open vs fail closed screening decision, and it has to be written into code, because RFC 9110 leaves error-handling policy to the application.

“Approve and screen later” fails on legal grounds, not only on risk appetite. OFAC’s FAQ 42 states that a U.S. financial institution cannot open an account for a person on the Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) List, because that is a prohibited service, and that an opening deposit from an applicant who matches the list must be blocked. Opening first and checking afterwards means committing the prohibited act and finding out later. Every block or rejection must then be reported to OFAC within 10 business days (31 CFR 501.603 and 501.604).

Two OFAC settlements show where fail-open behaviour actually hides. It is rarely the outage itself. It is what the system does on the way out of one.

  • Auto-release during a backlog. Between February 2013 and February 2018, Payoneer processed 2,220 transactions, worth $793,950.70 in total, in apparent violation of several sanctions programs. One cause, according to OFAC’s July 2021 release, was that during backlog periods flagged and pended payments were released automatically, without review. Payoneer settled for $1,385,901.40 and changed its filter to pend flagged transactions instead of letting them complete during a backlog.
  • A stale watchlist after a feed failure. OFAC’s 13 October 2026 settlement with Bank of America ($11,662,930) describes two update failures. From 24 May to 28 June 2023, a vendor error left the watchlist file un-updated. On 7 February 2025, an update reflecting the previous day’s designations failed to load and was fully activated only on 12 February. OFAC called the failure to update the watchlist for over a month reckless, and stated that each organisation stays responsible for its own compliance when it relies on a third-party provider.

Sanctions API error handling: four paths, four backend decisions

Every screening call ends in one of four ways, and each needs a different response from the backend. Sanctions API error handling goes wrong when the paths get mixed up: a bad API key treated like a timeout, or a missing field treated like a hit.

Error path Typical signal Account state Retry? Who acts
Technical HTTP 400 (request malformed) or 401 (credentials refused or expired) Pending; nothing screened No. The same request returns the same error Engineering, immediately
Timeout or outage No response within the client timeout, a dropped connection, a 5xx Pending Yes: short retries, then the pending queue Automation first; engineering alerted; compliance told if the SLA is breached
Validation A required field is missing or malformed, such as no last name Returned to the form After the applicant corrects it The applicant
Hit A potential or exact match above your threshold Held: no activation, no outbound funds No. A person decides Compliance analyst

Validate before you call. When OFAC explains how to confirm or rule out a match, it points analysts to date of birth, nationality, identification numbers and addresses, which is exactly what a thin request lacks. Reject incomplete input at your own form, so the provider’s validation error stays an alarm rather than part of the flow.

A 401 is not one failed applicant. Every call will fail until someone fixes the credentials, so alert on it at once and never let it retry in a loop.

KYC screening timeout handling: pending queue, retry interval, user messaging

Handle a timeout in three tiers.

  1. In session. Retry once or twice with exponential backoff and jitter, within a few seconds. If the provider answers 429 or 503 with a Retry-After header, wait at least that long. RFC 9110 defines the header’s value as either a number of seconds or an HTTP date.
  2. Pending queue. When the in-session attempts fail, set the account to pending and put the application into a durable screening pending queue. A worker retries at roughly 1, 5 and 15 minutes, then every 15 minutes. These are engineering defaults, not regulatory numbers. Tune them to your provider’s measured latency and your onboarding SLA.
  3. Escalation. A circuit breaker stops calls after consecutive failures, so you are not hammering a provider that is down. Engineering is paged, and compliance is told when the oldest pending application passes your SLA.

Make resubmission idempotent by keying each request on the application ID. A screen that succeeded just after your client gave up then produces one result, not two.

The queue’s release rule must never depend on time or load. The Payoneer case is the warning: its backlog drained itself without review. A pending application leaves the queue in exactly one way, through a stored clear result or an analyst’s recorded decision. When the provider returns, drain the queue oldest first, at a controlled rate.

Tell the user that verification is taking longer than usual, when they will hear from you and how to reach support. Do not tell them they are approved pending checks, and there is no need to name the cause.

True hit: account hold, compliance lane, manual review against the official list

A hit puts the account on hold before a human sees it. A hold is your internal state, not yet a legal action: it freezes activation and outbound funds while an analyst decides whether the match is real. Hold first, because releasing a true match is a violation. Review second, because many alerts are false positives. OFAC’s FAQ 48 says screening software flags transactions that have nothing to do with OFAC targets, and that this is where human intervention becomes critical.

The analyst follows OFAC’s FAQ 5, updated on 9 September 2026. Compare every detail of the list entry (names and aliases, date of birth, nationality, identification numbers, addresses) with what the applicant provided, and gather more information if needed. If only a first name matches, or the date of birth differs, the match is probably not valid, and the analyst can release the hold and record why. If several details match, follow your procedure for likely matches: check whether a general or specific licence applies, then decide between blocking and rejecting. Persons on the SDN List and entities blocked under OFAC’s 50 Percent Rule are blocked. A sanctioned jurisdiction with no blocked person involved is a rejection.

Both outcomes carry paperwork. Reports to OFAC are due within 10 business days, and investigation records must be kept (31 CFR 501.601; ten years, according to OFAC’s introduction). OFAC states that it does not confirm potential matches or false positives, so the decision and its evidence are yours. Log who decided, when and why, together with the screening reference, the list entry and the data screened.

Two design choices from the Bank of America case belong in the queue logic. A rule that automatically suppressed alerts matching an earlier false-positive decision let payments to blocked banks through. A prioritisation flaw ranked exact name-and-date-of-birth matches as low or medium priority for an extended period. Never auto-dismiss on past decisions without re-checking the list entry, and send exact matches to the front of the queue.

How to test a sanctions screening API outage before it happens

Testing and auditing is one of the five essential components in OFAC’s 2019 Framework for OFAC Compliance Commitments. In the Bank of America release, OFAC says screening alert parameters and rules should be subject to audit and testing.

Start with a production-parity sandbox. A sandbox is a valid test environment only if it matches production in authentication, rate limits and response structure. If it accepts a key that production would refuse, or never rate-limits, the 401, 429 and timeout branches you test are not the ones you will meet.

Then break it on purpose. Run these as automated tests on every release, not as manual checks after deployment, and repeat them as a periodic drill:

  • A revoked or expired API key: expect a 401, no activations and an alert within minutes.
  • A malformed payload: the 400 is treated as a bug, not retried.
  • A response slower than your client timeout: the account stays pending and the retry schedule starts.
  • A 503 with a Retry-After header: the next attempt waits at least that long.
  • A 200 OK with an empty body, truncated JSON or an unrecognised status value: not cleared.
  • The provider returns after two hours with hundreds of queued applications: oldest first, and none released without a stored result.
  • A watchlist feed that stops advancing: treated as an outage once it passes its freshness threshold.
  • A hit: the account is held, a case is opened and nothing moves.

One regression test is worth more than the rest: it fails the build if any code path can set an account to active without a stored clear result.

Frequently asked questions

How long can a customer stay pending?

None of the OFAC guidance cited here sets a maximum pending period, so the limit is the one you write: the account stays inactive until a result exists. Set an SLA, escalate to compliance when it is breached, and decide the fallback in advance. One fallback is manual. OFAC publishes a free Sanctions List Search tool for single-name searches across its lists, so a trained analyst can clear priority applicants by hand during a long outage and record the result. It covers OFAC lists only, so it does not replace PEP or other list checks.

Can payments flow while screening is pending?

Not for a party with no screening result. Anything involving that party waits. OFAC’s FAQ 42 compares blocked property to a bouncing ball: once it comes into your possession, you must stop it. Customers who were cleared earlier are a different case, because their exposure is a list change after clearance. That is the monitoring question below.

What about ongoing monitoring outages?

Treat the downtime as a gap to close. When service resumes, re-screen the whole customer base against every list change since the last successful run, oldest first, and log the window. OFAC explains in its SDN List FAQs where to download every change to the list, which tells you exactly what a gap missed. Bank of America did this: after activating the February 2025 update on 12 February, it ran a lookback and self-disclosed the 26 transactions it had processed on 7 February.

Speed matters. The FATF glossary defines “without delay” for targeted financial sanctions as, ideally, within a matter of hours of a UN Security Council designation. National rules turn that into firm deadlines, so check yours, but a gap of days is the wrong order of magnitude.

Posted by Olga Fёldi in Financial, AML & Regulatory Reporting Knowledge Base

Why Government API Projects Fail: 5 Blockers That Repeat

Government API integration projects stall for five recurring reasons: fragmented systems, legacy systems without APIs, data-protection rules, weak governance and standards, and a shortage of skills. The list comes from a 2025 review of Germany by the law firm ADVANT Beiten, and it echoes a warning the EU’s Joint Research Centre (JRC) made in 2020, that governments often handle API integration “ad hoc”.

None of the sources measures failure rates, so “fail” here means stalling, running late or never being reused.

Last reviewed: 25 October 2026. Every status below is as of that date.

What changed, most recent first:

  • 28 November 2025: the UK Government Digital Service (GDS) published the results of a 12-week alpha for a central API hub, which found government APIs hard to find, documentation limited and standards unevenly adopted.
  • 7 May 2025: ADVANT Beiten published part 6 of its GovTech trends series (in German), listing five obstacles to integration in Germany and seven recommendations.
  • 14 February 2025: netzpolitik.org reported the German National Regulatory Control Council’s (NKR) call for a “Government-as-a-Platform” model with binding interface standards.
  • 12 July 2024: the Interoperable Europe Act, Regulation (EU) 2024/903, began to apply. The duty to assess interoperability before new binding requirements follows from January 2025, according to Spain’s open data portal.

The pattern: case-by-case integration and why it never compounds

In 2020 the JRC published An Application Programming Interface (API) framework for digital government, by Mark Boyd, Lorenzino Vaccari, Monica Posada Sanchez and Dietmar Gattwinkel. It is the JRC API framework digital government bodies can score themselves against: 12 proposals in four pillars, which are policy support, platforms and ecosystems, people, and processes, with actions grouped by strategic, tactical and operational level. The authors start from the point that APIs make integration possible, but that integration is often handled “ad hoc”, without weighing its value to the wider digital environment.

I read “ad hoc” as every project negotiating access, format and security from scratch. Government workflow API integration, where one procedure touches several bodies’ systems, shows the cost: if a permit needs a register lookup, a payment and a notification, and each link is built separately, the next permit repeats all three negotiations.

The UK’s 2025 hub alpha shows what missing reuse looks like: government APIs were hard to find, and users expected a central space to reduce duplicated effort. Singapore’s APEX factsheet makes the same case from the other side, saying that letting agencies find and reuse existing APIs reduces digital silos and duplicated effort. Together they point to why government API projects fail to scale: without a place to find what exists, each project builds its own.

Five public sector API integration challenges, with a German example each

ADVANT Beiten’s authors, Dennis Hillemann and Johannes Voß-Lünemann, name five obstacles. Their review gives no concrete case for any of them, so each example below comes from a separate German public source.

1. Fragmented IT systems

Germany’s federal structure produced different systems and standards at federal, state and municipal level, and that makes data exchange much harder. The authors put it in one line: “Die deutsche Verwaltungslandschaft gleicht einem Flickenteppich nicht-kommunizierender Systeme” (German public administration resembles a patchwork of systems that do not communicate). On scale, netzpolitik.org’s account of the NKR report counts more than 10,000 municipalities, 16 state administrations and one federal administration. It adds that the states often have to invest heavily to adapt another state’s digital service, so many build their own.

2. Legacy systems without APIs

Many authorities still run legacy government systems without APIs, ADVANT Beiten says, and connecting them takes middleware or costly modernisation, which delays projects and raises their cost. A German trace is in the IT-Planungsrat’s practice-test report on OSCI and XTA transport (version 6, dated 9 May 2022). It recommends that all vendors of specialist applications (Fachverfahren) used in the “Einer für Alle” context offer XTA2 interfaces. I read that recommendation as a sign that such interfaces were not yet universal.

3. Data protection and security

ADVANT Beiten says strict privacy rules can restrict personal-data sharing between authorities, and that GDPR compliance needs security built into the API architecture. The GDPR does not ban the sharing (see the FAQ below), but in Germany the register link-up is set by statute. The Identifikationsnummerngesetz of 28 March 2021 requires data exchange between federal and state bodies to run exclusively over the Verbindungsnetz (§ 7(1)), routes exchange between different areas through encrypting intermediary bodies that work without access to message content (§ 7(2)), and requires transmissions between public bodies to be logged (§ 9). An API for those flows has to fit that route.

4. Governance and standardisation

Common API standards are hard to develop and enforce when autonomous authorities sit at several levels, ADVANT Beiten writes, and without clear structures uncoordinated one-off solutions are likely. The NKR proposes “Government-as-a-Platform”, as netzpolitik.org reports: a platform core, binding interface standards and shared building blocks, with a constitutional change that either gives the federal government the relevant legislative competence or strengthens the IT-Planungsrat. Hans-Günter Henneke of the Deutscher Landkreistag warns that centralised structures could undermine the ban on mixed administration (Mischverwaltung).

5. Resource and skills gaps

Many authorities, municipal ones above all, lack the staff and skills to build and maintain APIs, and the shortage of public-sector IT specialists slows ambitious projects, the review says. It gives no figure, and the nearest public number does not cover administrations: Bitkom’s 2025 survey of 855 companies counts about 109,000 unfilled IT positions in German companies, down from 149,000 in 2023. On the JRC side, the people pillar includes a proposal to establish cross-competency teams.

The review’s seven recommendations amount to a Germany GovTech API strategy in outline: a coordinated national API strategy, a central API platform with shared authentication, monitoring and documentation, common standards and data models, API training for public-sector IT staff, stepwise modernisation of legacy systems or middleware, pilot projects, and public-private partnerships.

What other governments built: X-Road, APEX and the UK’s API standards

ADVANT Beiten names these three among its international examples. Their own documentation shows what each does; none of it measures how many integrations they kept from stalling.

  • X-Road (Estonia): ADVANT Beiten describes it as a platform for secure data exchange between agency systems that implements the once-only principle. In the X-Road architecture documentation, a central server holds the database of members and the security policy, organisations connect through security servers (one server can host several organisations), and “There are no intermediaries”: data moves directly between organisations. It supports both a SOAP and a REST message protocol.
  • APEX (Singapore): the how-it-works page says APEX connects to each agency’s API gateway to discover its APIs, agencies choose which to list and add documentation, and calls keep flowing through the agency’s own gateway once access is granted. GovTech’s factsheet, last updated in November 2022, reports more than 2,400 API functions, 31 onboarded agencies and over 100 million API calls in a month, with access controls set by the agencies and a central log of all calls.
  • UK GDS: the API technical and data standards of 7 February 2018, since replaced by a 2019 version, ask for RESTful APIs where appropriate, HTTPS with TLS 1.2, OAuth2 bearer tokens, OpenAPI documentation and a deprecation notice period for breaking changes. In November 2025 the hub alpha still found APIs hard to find, and the planned minimum viable product is a refreshed catalogue with quality and security scores.

In X-Road and APEX I see one design choice: shared rules and a registry or catalogue, while each body keeps control of its own data and access rules. The UK case shows the limit of rules alone: a published standard did not, by itself, make APIs findable.

A checklist for vendors integrating with a public body

The JRC’s self-assessment tool is a questionnaire for public administrations. The questions below turn its four pillars around for a vendor deciding whether an integration will stall. They are my questions, not the JRC’s.

  • Policy support: which law, decree or contract defines the data flow, and who owns the API? Where the flow rests on GDPR Article 6(1)(c) or (e), Article 6(3) requires that basis to sit in Union or Member State law.
  • Platforms and ecosystems: does the body connect through a shared exchange layer or catalogue (X-Road or APEX style, or a transport standard such as eDelivery AS4 or Germany’s OSCI and XTA), or only point to point? Is there a test environment and a machine-readable description, WSDL for SOAP or OpenAPI for REST?
  • People: who at the authority or its IT service provider can answer technical questions, and is that a team or one person? The JRC proposes cross-competency teams.
  • Processes: how are versions, deprecation and change notices handled, and does the API have a product owner? The JRC’s processes pillar includes a proposal to follow an API product approach, and the 2018 GDS standard asks for versioned URLs and a deprecation notice period.

Frequently asked questions

Is there an EU API strategy?

Not as a single document or law that I could find as of 25 October 2026. The EU’s API rules come in pieces. Under Article 3(1) of Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/138, high-value datasets must be made available via APIs, with bulk download where the annex lists it; it applies from 9 June 2024. The Interoperable Europe Act requires an interoperability assessment before new or substantially modified binding requirements (Article 3(1)) and mentions an API only in recital 24, about the online assessment-reporting tool. The JRC framework is a set of recommendations, not law.

Does GDPR forbid inter-agency data sharing?

No. The GDPR sets conditions. Processing needs a lawful basis: Article 6(1)(c) covers a legal obligation and Article 6(1)(e) a task in the public interest or the exercise of official authority, and Article 6(3) requires that basis to be laid down in Union or Member State law. Data must be collected for specified, explicit and legitimate purposes and not processed further in an incompatible way (Article 5(1)(b)), and limited to what is necessary (Article 5(1)(c)). Article 6(4) sets a compatibility test for any new purpose. In my reading, the friction is a legal basis and a purpose per data flow, which has to exist before an API is specified.

Why do ministries still run SOAP services?

Public bodies keep SOAP where the exchange standard they connect through is built on it. The European Commission’s eDelivery AS4 profile, version 2.0 of 5 December 2024, uses SOAP 1.2 with attachments and makes WS-Security mandatory. X-Road offers both a SOAP and a REST message protocol. The 2018 GDS standard, by contrast, asks for REST where appropriate. ADVANT Beiten’s legacy point covers the rest: where an existing system has no modern interface, middleware is the practical bridge. My view is that changing the protocol does not, by itself, touch any of the five blockers.

Posted by Olga Fёldi in Public Authority & Certified Provider Integrations Knowledge Base